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ARTICLE 
The International Law of Unconventional Statecraft  
__________________________ 
Michael N. Schmitt* & Andru E. Wall** 
 
The enemy of my enemy is my friend. 
― Ancient proverb 
Introduction 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will cost the United States four to 
six trillion dollars.1 Add to this figure the outlays of the international 
community, and former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s cautionary 
maxim that if “you break it, you own it” resonates with particular clarity.2 
Upon reflection, the net national security benefits of regime change and 
nation-building through direct military campaigns appear somewhat 
dubious, if only from a fiscal standpoint.  
Beyond the daunting costs, classic direct military operations often 
prove less successful than indirect ones at producing desired long-term 
results.3 Although direct operations may disrupt or neutralize immediate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law and Director, the Stockton Center for 
the Study of International Law, United States Naval War College; Professor of Public 
International Law, University of Exeter. The views expressed in this Article are those of 
the author in his personal capacity. 
** Fellow, the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, United States Naval 
War College; senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central from 
2007 to 2009. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author in his personal 
capacity. 
1 Linda J. Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending 
Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 
FACULTY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES (Mar. 2013), 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=923 [http://perma.cc/J2KD-
WMYK]. 
2 BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 150 (2004). 
3 Linda Robinson, The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2013, at 110, 112. Direct military operations involve the sending of 
one’s own forces to another country to accomplish a mission. Indirect refers to operations 
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threats, the ensuing consequences can be disruptive and destabilizing. As 
current events in Iraq and Afghanistan aptly demonstrate, lasting stability is 
usually only possible when indigenous government institutions and security 
forces mature to a point where they can provide internal security without 
foreign assistance.  
Since at least the rise of the modern nation-state, states have thus 
availed themselves of opportunities to achieve national security objectives 
through support of proxy forces within the territory of hostile or unfriendly 
states.4 In past centuries, such activities were a common and accepted 
foreign policy tool, although states often kept their undertakings quiet for 
diplomatic, financial, or other reasons. Once states outlawed the use of 
coercive force in the twentieth century, support of foreign insurgencies 
tended to move underground.5  
 But the utility of these operations continues to be recognized. As the 
Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral William 
McRaven, has pointed out in testimony before the U.S. Congress, “the 
direct approach . . . only buys time and space for the indirect approach . . . 
[and] in the end, it will be such continuous indirect operations that will 
prove decisive in the global security arena.”6 It is no surprise, then, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in which another country invites the state to provide advice and assistance to its security 
forces. 
4 See, e.g., MAX BOOT, INVISIBLE ARMIES: AN EPIC HISTORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2013). Boot’s seminal work on guerrilla warfare—
a typical tool of insurgencies—concludes that guerrilla warfare was the norm (it was 
“conventional” warfare) throughout ancient history until the rise of the first “genuine 
armies” in Egypt and Mesopotamia after 3100 BC. Id. at 8–12. Foreign support of 
insurgent guerrillas became a common foreign policy tool with the rise of the post-
Westphalian nation-state and the liberal revolutions that began in the 1700s. See id., at 59–
63. Boot finds “outside assistance—whether in the form of arms supplies and safe havens 
or, even better, the provision of conventional forces to operate in conjunction with 
guerrillas—has been one of the most important factors in the success of insurgent 
campaigns.” See id., at xxvi. 
5 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-
Briand Pact of Paris), 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1928); U.N. Charter art. 2(4). For a historical survey 
of insurgencies, including foreign support thereof, in the twenty years following the signing 
of the U.N. Charter, see MICHAEL BURLEIGH, SMALL WARS, FARAWAY PLACES: GLOBAL 
INSURRECTION AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD, 1945–1965 (2013). 
6 William H. McRaven, United States Special Operations Command, Posture Statement of 
Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special Operations 
Command, presented to the 112th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee (Mar. 6, 
2012), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McRaven%2003-06-12.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3ATU-XW94].  
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President Barack Obama has sought to accomplish U.S. national security 
objectives, including regime change, through less than direct approaches to 
statecraft. In Libya, for instance, the United States and NATO combined 
direct (i.e., overt military operations) with indirect (i.e., covert support for 
rebel groups) operations to bring about regime change at a cost of less than 
two billion dollars.7  
 Indirect operations may be conducted either conventionally or 
unconventionally. In the security context, conventional indirect operations 
typically involve assistance to a friendly government struggling to maintain 
or secure control over its territory and population. The operations are 
considered “conventional” because they involve government-to-government 
activities; they are indirect in the sense that one government is advising and 
assisting another’s security efforts, rather than taking action itself.8 Prime 
examples include U.S. military operations to build and support Iraqi and 
Afghan security forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 
 Unconventional indirect activities, by contrast, consist of 
intelligence operatives or special operations forces working with rebel or 
insurgent forces against another government.9 As state support for foreign 
insurgencies and insurrections was driven underground by evolving 
international norms during the twentieth century, adjectives like dirty, 
secret, small, limited, irregular, covert, and unconventional were added to 
the term “war” to refer to these operations.10 The U.S. military labels them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBYA: TRANSITION AND U.S. 
POLICY 26 (Oct. 18, 2012). See also estimate by U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden quoted 
in Tom Cohen, Obama Pledges U.S. Support for Libya after Gadhafi, CNN (Oct. 20, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/20/us/gadhafi-reaction/ [http://perma.cc/5NA8-
M4R8]. It must be cautioned that the circumstances in Libya were rather unique. In 
particular, the rebel groups were unusually well organized and equipped, and the NATO 
military action was expressly authorized by the UN Security Council—two key factors 
unlikely to be seen again for some time. 
8 In U.S. military parlance, an operation in which an indigenous government force is 
trained, equipped, organized, and supported “to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security” is labeled 
“foreign internal defense.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD 
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, Nov. 8 2010, as amended through 
Oct. 15, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf [http://perma.cc/JPG7-
NV3M] [hereinafter JP 1-02]. 
9 For more on the conventional-unconventional distinction, see Andru E. Wall, 
Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence 
Activities & Covert Action, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 110–14 (2011). 
10 See generally PETER HARCLERODE, FIGHTING DIRTY (2001); JOHN J. TIERNEY, JR., 
CHASING GHOSTS: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2006); MAX 
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“unconventional warfare,” which it defines as “[a]ctivities conducted to 
enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow 
a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”11 
This Article examines the international law issues raised by 
“unconventional statecraft,” a term the Article adopts, as explained infra, in 
lieu of “unconventional warfare.” It questions whether, and if so when, 
foreign support to insurgents runs afoul of international legal norms 
designed to safeguard the sovereign prerogatives of other states. In this 
regard, it must be cautioned that the article assesses unconventional 
statecraft solely from the perspective of international law. Other normative 
restrictions on unconventional statecraft reside in the domestic legal regime, 
but are not addressed. It must also be cautioned that the authors recognize 
that because international law norms are usually backward-looking in the 
sense of responding to past events, there may be circumstances in which the 
law proves ill-suited in the face of contemporary threats. In such cases, 
national decision-makers may be compelled to authorize covert support to 
rebel forces because doing so is in the national or international interest and 
therefore legitimate, albeit unlawful. Of course, decisions to venture beyond 
the limits of international law described in this Article should be extremely 
rare. 
I. Unconventional Statecraft 
The term “unconventional statecraft” is employed in this Article to 
refer to external support by one state to insurgents in another. It has 
particular resonance when the two states concerned are not involved in an 
international armed conflict.12 Consider the case of a state that is assisting 
insurgent forces in hopes of toppling an unfriendly government. The state is 
not presently engaged in an international armed conflict with the target state 
and does not intend to provide any support that would trigger an armed 
conflict as a matter of law. To label the first state’s activities 
“unconventional warfare” would misconstrue the situation through use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER 
(2002). 
11 JP 1-02, supra note 8, at 283. 
12 The term “international armed conflict” refers to a conflict between two or more states, 
as distinct from a non-international armed conflict, which involves hostilities at a 
significant level that take place between a state and a non-state armed group, or between 
two non-state groups. See Common Articles 2 & 3 to the four Geneva Conventions. 
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the highly pejorative term “warfare” and suggest that the governing legal 
regime is necessarily the law of armed conflict.13 
 “Statecraft,” defined as the “art of conducting State affairs,”14 
accurately describes such activities regardless of whether they occur outside 
or within the context of an armed conflict. Statecraft encompasses all 
national resources that are available to achieve national objectives (e.g., 
diplomatic, economic, communications, intelligence, and military means). 
Effectively exercised, statecraft “identifies the things that are important and 
frames objectives and purposes in a way that others can accept; employs 
extensive communication channels to build understanding and to reduce the 
possibility for misperceptions; and uses all available assets to promote 
national interests and to counter real and potential threats.” 15  
 “Unconventional” statecraft, then, refers to activities designed to 
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating with or through a resistance movement or insurgency in a denied 
area.16 It can include, inter alia, diplomatic, economic, information, 
intelligence, or military support and can occur during peacetime or in an 
ongoing non-international or international armed conflict. The insurgents 
may be waging an independent campaign against the government, or they 
may be agents of the state providing the assistance. Whatever the case, the 
art of unconventional statecraft is to develop and sustain the insurgency’s 
indigenous capabilities and channel them in ways that foster the national 
security objectives of the state engaging in unconventional statecraft. 
II. Unconventional Statecraft and Intervention 
The international law principle of non-intervention prohibits states 
from using coercive means to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
other states.17 Stemming from the principle of sovereignty,18 this prohibition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The law of armed conflict only applies once an international or non-international armed 
conflict commences. Otherwise, operations are governed principally by international 
human rights law and domestic law. The existence of an armed conflict between two states 
also has significant implications for the laws of sovereignty and of state responsibility. 
14 DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 8 (1985). 
15 Dennis Ross, Remember Statecraft?, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR (Summer 2007), 
http://theamericanscholar.org/remember-statecraft/ [http://perma.cc/YQ7M-ES5Y]. 
16 A denied area is “[a]n area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces 
cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force 
capabilities.” JP 1-02, supra note 8, at 704. 
17 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter is often mistakenly referred to as a codification of the 
prohibition. It is not. The non-intervention principle applies to intervention by one state 
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has been recognized by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a 
fundamental norm of customary international law.19 Most states, including 
the United States, accept the principle as a binding aspect of international 
law,20 a view echoed by such august bodies as the International Law 
Commission.21  
The key to the prohibition is the requirement of coercion.22 States 
often take actions designed to influence other states, the classic example 
being diplomacy. However, an act is only coercive when it is intended to 
compel another state to behave in a manner other than how it normally 
would, or to refrain from taking an action it would otherwise take. 
Persuasion or propaganda does not qualify, nor do actions that merely affect 
another state’s decision-making processes, such as cutting off trade with the 
target state.  
While the line between lawful actions and unlawful intervention is 
indistinct, the ICJ held in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua) that “financial support, training, supply of 
weapons, intelligence and logistic support” amount to intervention.23 
Similarly, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation, the U.N. General Assembly stated that 
organizing, instigating, assisting, financing, or participating in acts of civil 
strife or terrorist acts in another state, or “acquiescing in organized activities 
within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,” 
constituted unlawful intervention.24 The ICJ later characterized this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
into the affairs of another. Article 2(7) addresses intervention by the United Nations. U.N. 
Charter art. 2(7). 
18 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, ¶¶ 205, 251 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
19 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); Nicaragua, supra note 18, at 
¶ 202; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 161–63 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities]. 
20 See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Special Briefing, Secretary Clinton’s Meeting with 
Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/aug/128079.htm [http://perma.cc/EQ83-N5TL]. 
21 See, e.g., Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States art. 3, G.A. Res. 375, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/375(IV) (Dec. 6, 1949).  
22 See Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 205.  
23 Id. ¶ 228. 
24 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. DOC. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 24, 
1970). 
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statement as accurately reflecting customary international law.25 Thus, it 
appears that many forms of unconventional statecraft qualify as intervention 
as a matter of law. 
Although there seems to be consensus as to the existence of a 
principle of non-intervention, it is equally apparent that it has been seen 
more in the breach than the observance. As Professor Oscar Schachter 
observed nearly thirty years ago: 
Foreign military interventions in civil wars have been so 
common in our day that the proclaimed rule of non-
intervention may seem to have stood on its head. 
Talleyrand’s cynical quip comes to mind: “non-intervention 
is a word that has the same meaning as intervention.”26 
Along the same lines, Professor John Norton Moore has referred to a 
“fundamental ambivalence toward intervention which has rendered 
traditional norms of limited utility.”27 States that “vehemently oppose 
intervention when it proceeds against their interests” will favor external 
assistance to governments or opposition groups aligned with those states’ 
national interests.28  
Such common concerns were addressed head-on in Nicaragua by 
the ICJ. There, the Court cautioned that “[i]t is not to be expected that in the 
practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been 
perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete 
consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each other’s 
internal affairs.”29 The Court went on to point out that “[e]xpressions of an 
opinio juris regarding the existence of the principle of non-intervention in 
customary international law are numerous and not difficult to find.”30 
Whether the principle of non-intervention has substantive import or 
is essentially hortatory in nature (the authors differ on this point), it is 
apparent that assessments of intervention are inherently contextual and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 264; Armed Activities, supra note 19, at ¶ 162. 
26 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 
160 (1982). 
27 John Norton Moore, Introduction, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD xiv 
(John Norton Moore ed., 1974). 
28 Id. 
29 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 186. 
30 Id. ¶ 202. 
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value-driven, thereby rendering precise normative standards elusive. States 
that engage in unconventional statecraft that might violate the prohibition 
on intervention must necessarily weigh the possible costs of such charges 
against any potential advancement of the national interests at stake. 
III. Unconventional Statecraft and the Use of Force 
The salient questions in the context of this Article are: (1) when 
does unconventional statecraft violate international law’s prohibition on the 
use of force, and (2) when does unconventional statecraft constitute an 
armed attack such that it triggers the right of self-defense on the part of the 
target state?31 There is no stock answer, for unconventional statecraft 
activities vary widely. Therefore, following a brief summary of the 
applicable normative framework, the spectrum of unconventional statecraft 
depicted in Figure 1 will frame the analysis.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The ICJ has recognized two conditions for the exercise of the right of self-defense—
necessity and proportionality. Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶¶ 176, 194; Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Oil 
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76 (Nov. 6). Necessity requires that 
non-forceful means be unavailable to reliably put an end to the situation justifying 
defensive actions. Proportionality requires that whatever force is employed to do so be no 
more than needed to achieve that end. A third criterion is imminence, which requires 
defensive uses of force be taken in the face of a prospective armed attack only when the 
opportunity to defend oneself is about to evaporate. The obligation derives in part from the 
correspondence regarding the Caroline incident. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 
24, 1841), 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129 (1840–41). On the requirements, 
see Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism under the Jus ad Bellum: 
A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE 
FAULTLINES 157 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). The U.S. government has 
adopted the standard. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a 
Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of 
Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force, Draft, at 7 (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ES6D-Y3GH].  
Fig. 1 Spectrum of Support for Rebels 
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A. The Normative Framework 
Universal agreement exists regarding the most egregious form of 
intervention, an unlawful use of force. Accordingly, unconventional 
statecraft involving support to rebel or other armed groups in another state 
is perhaps most often assessed in the context of the international regulation 
of coercive force.  
The United Nations Charter ushered out the last vestiges of the 
traditional normative paradigm whereby states were generally free to 
resolve disputes by force, and introduced a legal system premised on 
collective security rather than self-help.32 The cornerstone of this modern 
jus ad bellum is Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. It provides that “[a]ll 
Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” The article reflects customary law and is 
generally considered a jus cogens norm, that is, one from which no 
deviation is permitted.33 
Unfortunately, the Charter does not define the term “use of force,” 
nor does the text of Article 2(4) add granularity to the concept. The context, 
travaux préparatoires, and subsequent treatment, however, leave little 
question that the Charter banned armed force, while lesser forms of 
coercion, such as economic or psychological coercion, were not outlawed.34 
Nevertheless, questions remain as to what exactly is prohibited. This 
uncertainty is particularly relevant in the context of unconventional 
statecraft. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In the scheme envisioned by the Charter’s drafters, the Security Council would enforce 
the prohibition using a standing military force to guarantee the collective security of the 
international community. See U.N. Charter arts. 43–47. No state has ever seconded its 
troops. Rather, collective security is guaranteed by states—occasionally through regional 
organizations—acting ad hoc and volitionally in individual or collective self-defense. For 
the historical development of the prohibition on the use of force, see YORAM DINSTEIN, 
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 65–87 (5th ed. 2012); Albrecht Randelzhofer & 
Oliver Dörr, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY I, 
200, 204–07 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
33 See, e.g., Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 190 (citing the International Law Commission’s 
commentary to Article 50 of its draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 2 YEARBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 247 (1966), A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l). 
34 DINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 88; Randelzhofer & Dorr, supra note 32, at 208–10. 
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There are two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. First, 
a use of force authorized or mandated by the Security Council pursuant to 
its Chapter VII authority does not violate Article 2(4).35 While the 
likelihood of the Security Council’s authorizing unconventional statecraft is 
low, the possibility is plausible. For instance, it might authorize the arming 
of insurgent forces fighting an oppressive and illegitimate regime engaged 
in widespread human rights abuses. Any such authorization would preclude 
characterization of the actions as a wrongful use of force. 
Of greater significance in the context of unconventional statecraft is 
the second exception. While Article 2(4) outlaws the right of states to use 
military force to resolve interstate disputes, Article 51 preserves their 
“inherent right” to use force in individual or collective self-defense:  
Nothing in this present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to restore international 
peace and security.36 
Like “use of force,” the Charter left the term “armed attack” undefined. The 
two phrases have resultantly generated much debate among practitioners 
and in the academy over the years.37 With nearly seventy years of 
interpretative state practice to consider, the original intent of the drafters is 
of diminishing interest.38 Opinio juris sive necessitatis—the practice of 
states coupled with a belief that the practice was required by or consistent 
with international law—reflects a broad interpretation of the concept of 
armed attack. Since the inception of the UN Charter, states have defended 
most unilateral uses of force as legitimate acts of self-defense in response to 
armed attacks.39 This has been the case regardless of whether the attack in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 U.N. Charter art. 42. 
36 U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
37 See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the 
Charter of the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 792 (1948); DAVID W. BOWETT, 
SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 182–93 (1958); Nicholas Rostow, The 
International Use of Force after the Cold War, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 420 (1991); IAN 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 273–75 (1963).  
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 
see REIN MÜLLERSON, ORDERING ANARCHY: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 310 (2000) (“International law of the year 2000 cannot be the same as 
international law of 1945.”). 
39 Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 259 (1989). 
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question was in response to an armed strike by military forces, occurred on 
its own territory, or was carried out by state or non-state actors. 
The Charter’s recognition of the right to use force in self-defense 
against an “armed attack” raises the question of whether all uses of force are 
armed attacks. Put another way, does an illegal use of force—i.e., a use of 
force not in self-defense or pursuant to a Security Council resolution—
necessarily constitute an armed attack, or is a degree of magnitude required 
for a use of force to be classified as an armed attack? Both logic and 
pragmatism dictate that any “gap between Article 2(4) (‘use of force’) and 
Article 51 (‘armed attack’) ought to be no more than a hiatus.”40 If the 
Article 51 magnitude were significantly higher than that of Article 2(4), as 
opponents of military action often assert, then one state could carry out low-
intensity uses of force against another and the latter would be limited in its 
response by Article 2(4) to only non-forcible responses, such as 
countermeasures.41 The view that the gap is large is without support in state 
practice.42 
The question remains, however, whether any gap exists at all. In 
Nicaragua, the ICJ looked to customary international law to differentiate 
the terms. The ICJ noted at the outset that “it will be necessary to 
distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an 
armed attack) from other less grave forms.”43 Quoting the UN General 
Assembly resolution defining “aggression,” which, in its view, “may be 
taken to reflect customary international law,” the Court stated that armed 
attack included  
not merely action by regular armed forces across an international 
border, but also “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of 
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to” 
(inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces . . . . 
The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 DINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 208. 
41 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 22, Rep. 
of the Int’l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 
(2001), reprinted in 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32 (2001), 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. 
42 See, e.g., Claude H. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 451, 496 (1952) (arguing that it misreads the 
entire intention of Article 51 to interpret it as implicitly “forbidding forcible self-defence in 
resistance to an illegal use of force not constituting an armed attack”). 
43 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 191. 
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prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State 
of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such operation, 
because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an 
armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been 
carried out by regular armed forces.44 
The ICJ then opined that it did not believe that “assistance to rebels in the 
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support” was 
included within “the concept of ‘armed attack,’ [although it] may be 
regarded as a threat or use of force . . . .”45  
Since Nicaragua, the United States has rejected the premise of a gap 
between the use of force and armed attack thresholds. As an illustration, in 
late 2012, the State Department’s Legal Adviser stated, “the inherent right 
of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force. In our 
view, there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an ‘armed 
attack’ that may warrant a forcible response.”46 This position represents the 
minority view in the international law community, even though, as noted, in 
practice States tend to justify most uses of force based on self-defense.47 
The authors differ in whether a gap exists as a matter of law, but concur that 
if it does it is certainly narrow and has historically enjoyed little practical 
relevance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Id. ¶ 195. 
45 Id. It is impossible to divorce the ICJ’s finding from its political context. Arguably, if the 
ICJ had found that providing arms to rebels in another country always amounts to an armed 
attack, then many of the U.S. actions in support of the Contras would have been justified as 
acts of collective self-defense (leaving aside the issue of a request). By denying that 
provisions of arms to rebels necessarily amounts to an armed attack, the ICJ restricted the 
permissible responses to “countermeasures”—“a tautological rationale that enabled it to 
deny the right of joint action.” Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force 
(Luncheon Address), 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 420, 425 (1988); see Nicaragua, supra 
note 18, at ¶ 211 (“States do not have a right of ‘collective’ armed response to acts which 
do not constitute an ‘armed attack.’”).  
46 Harold H. Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, Address at the USCYBERCOM Inter-
Agency Legal Conference, Ft. Meade, Maryland (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2012); see William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms 
Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 299–302 (2004); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the 
Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 93–96 (1989). 
47 See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE 47, 55 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
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B. Humanitarian Aid and Intelligence Activities  
Humanitarian aid and intelligence are often the starting point for 
building a relationship between a state and the insurgents it supports. 
Depending on the country and extent of any preexisting relationship, 
intelligence operatives and special operations forces typically establish 
contacts with insurgent leaders and begin discussing possible collaboration 
in pursuit of mutual objectives; this frequently occurs in neighboring 
countries. The provision of humanitarian assistance such as food and 
medical supplies and the sharing of intelligence are often effective means of 
establishing rapport with insurgents.48 Such a relationship is essential in 
“persuading and leading irregular surrogates to act in concert with U.S. 
objectives [and] is a human political interaction that is inherently difficult to 
control.”49 
There can be little question that humanitarian aid (including food, 
medical supplies, tents and other temporary shelters, non-military vehicles, 
and communications equipment) does not amount to an unlawful use of 
force. The ICJ has held that “the mere supply of funds . . . does not in itself 
amount to a use of force,” even when used to support an insurgency 
generally.50 It would clearly be incongruent to nevertheless style the in-kind 
provision of humanitarian aid as a use of force. However, although it may 
not amount to a use of force, the ICJ has suggested that an essential element 
of humanitarian assistance is that it can be distributed “without 
discrimination” consistent with principles espoused by the International 
Conference of the Red Cross.51 In its view, humanitarian assistance 
delivered or made available only to rebels (as opposed to the larger 
population) in another country would violate the principle of non-
intervention.52 And the non-consensual penetration of another state’s 
territory to deliver any aid in situ would in traditional international law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Typically, U.S. forces collect intelligence to assess the capabilities and intentions of both 
the insurgent and indigenous government forces. Department of Army, FM 3-05.201, 
Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, ¶¶ 1–7 (Apr. 2003). In many cases, the 
activities include paying insurgents for information about local political leaders or security 
personnel—a mutually beneficial activity that gives the supporting government’s forces 
important information, while also providing (minimal) financial support to individual (or 
collective) insurgent leaders and participants. 
49 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 
¶¶ 3–44 (Sept. 2008). 
50 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 228. 
51 Id. ¶¶ 242–43. 
52 Id. ¶ 243. 
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terms amount to a violation of sovereignty in the form of a breach of 
territorial integrity.53  
 It is well accepted that espionage is not, in itself, a breach of 
international law.54 Indeed, although typically a violation of domestic law, 
states widely engage in intelligence collection. Of course, depending on 
their purpose, intelligence operations may constitute an intervention. For 
instance, providing rebels with targeting intelligence that directly facilitates 
attacks would clearly qualify as coercive and therefore amount to use of 
force. States may also view “aid to a force opposing the government as a 
violation of the sovereignty and independence of the State.”55 However, the 
act of gathering intelligence does not comprise a use of force and 
accordingly could not qualify as an armed attack thereby opening the door 
to a forceful response.  
C. Training, Logistics, and Arms  
As rapport is established with the insurgents, support typically 
expands to training, organizational assistance, logistics support, and, 
sometimes, the provision of arms. If supporting forces do not have access to 
the areas where the insurgents operate, these activities may take place in a 
third country, often a neighboring state or a regional ally. Training and 
organizational assistance can include such areas as leadership, 
organizational structure and operation, communications, intelligence 
gathering, planning and executing political activities, influence operations, 
and planning and executing direct action such as sabotage and guerrilla 
operations.  
As insurgent capabilities are slowly built, the supporting 
government’s forces may begin conducting unconventional activities of 
their own beyond intelligence collection, especially information operations 
such as subversion. Subversion, as the name implies, consists of operations 
designed to undermine the morale of a regime; they are necessarily 
clandestine and may be performed by the supporting government forces or 
insurgents trained to conduct them.56 Subversion includes efforts to weaken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The classic expression of sovereignty is Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 
838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).  
54 See generally Richard A. Falk, Forward, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW vi (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962). 
55 John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 247, 265 (Oscar 
Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995). 
56 JP 1-02, supra note 8, at 260.  
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military, economic, or political strength by using information and 
disinformation to create a psychological lacuna between the regime and its 
affected populations. For example, surrogates may be paid to spread rumors 
in local coffee shops and marketplaces about the corrupt practices of regime 
leaders.  
There is no question that direct involvement in support of an 
insurrectional movement in another country amounts to intervention. 
However, as noted, the normatively and practically significant question is 
whether it rises to the level of a “threat or use of force.” Non-lethal 
activities (e.g., leadership training, organizational assistance, political or 
economic intelligence gathering, political subversion, or information 
operations) do not cross that threshold. Similarly, logistics support related 
solely to non-lethal activities (e.g., humanitarian aid) would not reach that 
level, at least so long as the state’s forces did not violate the territorial 
integrity of the target state in order to deliver material.  
Providing lethal (“military”) training and logistical support, such as 
instruction on the use of weapons or transporting of rebel forces during 
operations, would, by contrast, be an unlawful use of force. The provision 
of arms would unquestionably qualify as such. This was the ICJ’s holding 
in Nicaragua, which involved U.S. support to insurgents known as the 
Contras. The Court stated that “the arming and training of the [C]ontras can 
certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua.”57 
As noted, the ICJ held that while the provision of training, logistical 
support, or weapons contravenes the prohibition on the use of force, it does 
not amount to an armed attack such that the target state may respond against 
the supporting state with force of its own pursuant to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and customary law. This characterization is unacceptable to the 
United States, which, as discussed, recognizes no gap between the use of 
force and the armed attack thresholds; it considers all uses of force to be 
armed attacks.58 Accordingly, by the U.S. position, once indirect, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 228.  
58 As discussed in greater length in our Conclusion, infra, this “fundamentalist” 
interpretation of the modern jus ad bellum served U.S. interests well throughout the Cold 
War as it delegitimized foreign-supported insurrections (e.g., communist revolutions), or 
other forms of proxy warfare, except as a defensive measure. Indeed, as early as the 1950s, 
the United States took the position that any interpretation of armed attack that respects state 
practice must include “an armed revolution which is fomented from abroad, aided and 
assisted from abroad.” See, e.g., U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ argument that 
the provision of arms to rebels in Lebanon in 1958 constituted an armed attack justifying 
 Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5  
	  
364 
unconventional activities qualify as a use of force, the right of self-defense 
is triggered; the target state would be entitled to employ force to defend 
itself, not only against the insurgents, but also against the supporting state. 
As Judge Stephen Schwebel detailed in his scathing dissent to the 
Nicaragua judgment, “the United States has consistently been among the 
most forceful advocates of [the] view that the use of armed groups by a 
State to carry out military activities against another State amounts to a use 
of force.”59  
D. Joint Operations 
Insurgencies or other armed resistance movements normally engage 
in some form of guerrilla warfare against the government.60 Guerrilla 
warfare generally consists of attacks conducted in areas the rebels do not 
control and is typified by “hit-and-run” attacks by insurgents that do not 
wear uniforms or otherwise openly advertise their armed nature.61 Beyond 
the external government involvement discussed above, participation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the U.S. response under Article 51, quoted in Sofaer, supra note 45, at 422. Considerable 
support for the U.S. position can be found in customary international law. For example, in 
1869, Spain seized the Mary Lowell, a U.S.-flagged vessel that was carrying military 
supplies to insurgents in Cuba; an international arbiter later found the seizure was justified 
on the grounds of self-defense as the “illegality” of delivering arms to “insurgents” 
forfeited protection of the U.S. flag. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENCE IN THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE DUBROVNIK 
RESOLUTION 21 (1958); C.H. Campbell v. Spain (Dec. 9, 1879), XXIX REP. OF INT’L 
ARBITRAL AWARDS 209, 210–11 (2012), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXIX/209-
212.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9ST-72KL]. 
59 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 234 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). 
60 Illustrative examples of successful guerrilla warfare include the Cossacks and peasant 
bands that broke Napoleon's army in Russia, the operations of Spanish guerrillas or 
partidas during the Peninsular War, the Boer War, the Cuban revolts against Spain, the 
Philippine Insurrection, various North African operations against French and Spanish 
colonial rule, and the Spanish Civil War. R. Ernest Dupuy, The Nature of Guerrilla 
Warfare, 12 PAC. AFF. 138, 141 (June 1939). Some scholars suggest that modern guerrilla 
warfare originated out of necessity with the Irish Republican Army in 1917–1921, because 
after 1891 the “increasing sophistication of military technology made contests between 
regular armies and popular forces more unequal than before.” Charles Townshend, The 
Irish Republican Army and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare 1916–1921, 94 THE 
ENG. HIST. REV. 318, 319 (Apr. 1979).  
61 For example, when Umkhonto, the paramilitary wing of the African National Congress, 
initiated its guerrilla campaign against the apartheid government in South Africa in 1961, it 
“gave first priority to a campaign of sabotage against power and communication facilities 
and government buildings.” Sheridan Johns, Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare—A South 
African Case Study, 11 J. AFR. STUD. 267, 273 (June 1973). 
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sometimes involves outside operational direction and control or even 
fighting alongside the insurgents. Indeed, the missions of U.S. Special 
Operations Forces include unconventional warfare, which involves 
“advising and assisting guerrilla forces to raid, ambush, sabotage, and 
otherwise interdict the adversary in ways designed to drain that hostile 
power’s morale and resources through military activities up to and 
including combat.”62 
It is indisputable that once armed forces of a state engage in combat 
operations against those of another state, the armed attack threshold has 
been crossed. Recall that in Nicaragua the ICJ characterized “action by 
regular armed forces across an international border” as the paradigmatic 
illustration of an armed attack.63 The reference to “regular” armed forces 
was meant not to distinguish them from Special Forces, but rather to 
indicate that they were the forces of another state.  
With respect to the relationship between insurgent forces and an 
external state, the Court articulated the “sending by or on behalf of a State” 
standard mentioned supra. When the standard is met, military operations of 
the insurgent group in question may be treated as an armed attack by the 
external state. Caution is merited in applying the standard. Unconventional 
statecraft often involves some degree of external control and direction over 
insurgent forces, if only because the insurgent forces may rely on the state 
for funding, arms, intelligence, and other essential support. However, the 
threshold for attributing the group’s actions to the supporting state (as 
distinct from attributing responsibility to that state for its own actions in 
assisting the insurgents) is very high. After all, an armed attack opens the 
door to justifiable uses of force in response.  
The ICJ did not expound on the threshold. However, it is reasonable 
to apply the state responsibility standard of effective control (discussed 
infra) by analogy in the sense that “sending by or on behalf” means the 
exercise of direction and control over all aspects of a group’s operations, 
not just a general degree of control over its activities. In other words, the 
group in question must de facto be an armed force available to the other 
state. In practical terms, a state has effective control over an insurgent group 
when it can direct the group to engage in operations it would otherwise not 
engage in or desist in those it would wish to conduct. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 FM 3-05.130, supra note 49, at ¶¶ 5–31. 
63 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 195. 
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Reflecting on the aforementioned discussions, the most recent 
edition of Oppenheim’s classic international law treatise illustrates the 
approach of the Court and most commentators: 
In light of the Court’s judgment in [Nicaragua] it seems that action 
in support of opposition forces within another state may constitute 
intervention, even if the support is of non-military kind; if it has a 
military character but is limited to such indirect support as the 
supply of weapons or logistic support, it may constitute not only 
intervention but also an unlawful threat or use of force, but would 
not amount to an armed attack; and if it involves direct military 
action by the supporting state (whether on the part of its regular 
forces or through the dispatch of armed bands on a significant 
scale) it is in addition likely to constitute an armed attack . . . .64 
Some commentators, as well as the United States, consider the distinction 
between “the dispatch by one State of armed bands into the territory of 
another State” (an act that would constitute an armed attack) and “the 
supply of arms and other support to such bands” (activities that “may” 
constitute an illegal use of force but not an armed attack) to be tortured.65 
That is the opinion of one of the authors of this Article. In the view of such 
critics, the ICJ’s surgical distinction finds no support in state practice. For 
instance, just two years after the Charter was enacted, the United States 
denounced the foreign support provided to rebels in Greece in a statement 
to the UN Security Council: 
In modern times, there are many ways in which force can be used 
by one State against the territorial integrity of another. Invasion by 
organized armies is not the only means for delivering an attack 
against a country’s independence. Force is effectively used today 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. I: PEACE 431–32 (Robert Jennings & Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). Professor Thomas Franck framed the issue thus nearly twenty 
years before the Nicaragua decision: 
 
No doubt a line of continuity runs from invasions by tanks and divisions 
through training, arming, sheltering and infiltrating neighboring 
insurgents, all the way down to hostile radio propaganda calling for 
revolution in a foreign country. However, these acts, while generically 
related, are also significantly dissimilar, and the law, if there is to be one, 
cannot simply ignore the differences. 
 
Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 813–14 (1970). 
65 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 247. 
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through devious methods of infiltration, intimidation and 
subterfuge.66 
Significantly, during the Nicaragua proceedings, both the United States and 
Nicaragua agreed that “a nation providing material, logistics support, 
training, and facilities to insurgent forces fighting against the government of 
another State is engaged in a use of force legally indistinguishable from 
conventional military operations by regular armed forces.”67 In his dissent, 
Judge Schwebel cited “ample and significant” state practice in support of 
this principle.68 
IV. Unconventional Statecraft and the Law of State Responsibility 
Pursuant to the law of state responsibility, a state bears 
“responsibility” for any internationally wrongful acts attributable to it.69 
When a state is responsible for an internationally wrongful act, an “injured 
State” may demand cessation and (or) reparations.70 It may also take 
countermeasures.71 Countermeasures are state actions or omissions directed 
at the offending state that would otherwise violate an obligation owed to 
that state. They are designed to compel the offending state into compliance 
with international law.72 To the extent that unconventional statecraft 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 2 U.N. SCOR (147th and 148th mtg.), 1120–21 (1947) as quoted in Nicaragua, supra 
note 18, at ¶ 235 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). 
67 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 158 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
68 Id. ¶ 219.  
69 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 41, at art. 1. The ICJ has recognized this 
principle of international law. Corfu Channel, supra note 19, at 23; Nicaragua, supra note 
18, at ¶¶ 283, 292; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 47 
(Sept. 25). The Permanent Court of International Justice enunciated the same principle 
earlier. See, e.g., Phosphates in Morocco (It. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A/B), No. 74, at 10, 28 (June 14); Case of the S.S. “Wimbledon” (U.K., Fr., It. & 
Jap.), 1923 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 1, at 15, 30 (Aug. 17); Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 3, 29–30 (July 26).  
70 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 41, arts. 30–31, 34–37, 42, 48(1). 
Reparations may take the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. Id. art. 34. 
Restitution involves the reestablishment of the situation that existed prior to the 
internationally wrongful act. Id. art. 35. Compensation involves financial payment for 
damage incurred by the internationally wrongful act to the extent that the damage is not 
made good by restitution. Id. art. 36(1). Satisfaction consists of “an acknowledgment of the 
breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or other appropriate modality.” Id. art. 
37(2). 
71 Id. arts. 22, 50–54. 
72 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 82–83; Nicaragua, supra note 18, at 
¶ 249; see Responsabilité de l’Allemagne à raison des dommages causés dans les colonies 
portugaises du sud de l’Afrique (“Naulilaa”) (Port. v. Ger.), II R.I.A.A. 1011, 1025–26 
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violates international law, the injured state may avail itself of these state 
responsibility remedies. For instance, if one state engages in unconventional 
statecraft that amounts to wrongful intervention, the target state may 
respond with proportionate actions of its own that would otherwise violate 
that (or another) norm. 
Only actions that are legally attributable to the state engaged in the 
unconventional statecraft open the door to such remedies. Attribution is 
clearest when state organs, such as the Special Forces or intelligence 
agencies, engage in the activities.73 In fact, the state bears responsibility 
even when those activities are ultra vires, that is, unauthorized.74  
Attribution also results when one state assists in the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act by another, at least so long as it is aware of 
the circumstances surrounding the act.75 As an example, if state A provides 
airlift or intelligence for state B’s unconventional statecraft activities that 
qualify as a use of force, state A will bear responsibility for state B’s 
actions. Similarly, if state A provides funding for the purchase of arms that 
are subsequently delivered by state B to insurgents in state C, the wrongful 
conduct of state B will be attributable to state A. In such a case, state A’s 
assistance to state B must constitute an integral component of the operation 
before attribution attaches. For instance, state A’s general financial support 
to state B’s program to undermine the government of state C would not 
render it liable for the transfer of weapons to insurgents that were purchased 
without the knowledge or intent of state A.76 
In relation to unconventional statecraft, most significant is the 
attribution of the acts of individuals or groups opposing a foreign 
government. Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility, the 
International Law Commission’s authoritative restatement of that body of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1928); Responsabilité de l’Allemagne en raison des actes commis postérieurement au 31 
juillet 1914 et avant que le Portugal ne participât à la guerre (“Cysne”), (Port. v. Ger.), II 
R.I.A.A. 1035, 1052 (1930); Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 
XVIII R.I.A.A. 416, 443–46 (1979). 
73 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 41, at art. 4(1).  
74 Id. art. 7.  
75 Id. art. 16. A state will also bear responsibility for another state’s internationally 
wrongful unconventional statecraft when the former directs and controls the latter’s 
commission of the operation. Id. art. 17. Such situations are unlikely, for states are seldom 
in sufficient control (as distinct from influence) of another state for the rule of attribution to 
apply. One exception suggested by recent events is belligerent occupation. 
76 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 151 (2002). 
 2014 / International Law of Unconventional Statecraft 369 
 
	  
law, provides that “[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of 
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”77 The conduct is 
“attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the specific 
operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of that 
operation.”78 Incidental or peripheral association does not warrant 
attribution. Additionally, unlike the activities of state organs, attribution 
based on direction and control does not occur in the case of ultra vires 
acts.79 
The precise threshold of control that generates attribution is unclear. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ considered the responsibility of the United 
States for acts committed by the Contra insurgents it supported against the 
Government of Nicaragua. The Court held that 
[a]ll the forms of United States participation mentioned above, and 
even the general control by the respondent State over a force with 
a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, 
without further evidence, that the United States directed or 
enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and 
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could 
well be committed by members of the contras without the control 
of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal 
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be 
proved that that State had effective control of the military or 
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged 
violations were committed.80 
In its Genocide judgment,81 the ICJ clarified the notion of effective control 
by distinguishing it from the “overall control test” enunciated by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 41, at art. 8. The “on the instructions” 
situation refers to the recruitment or instigation of a group of private individuals by a state 
to operate as its auxiliary without being specifically commissioned to do so pursuant to the 
domestic legal regime, as with a group of volunteers who conduct cyber operations on 
behalf of a state. The notion is generally inapplicable to unconventional statecraft 
operations. 
78 CRAWFORD, supra note 76, at 110. 
79 Id. at 113. 
80 Nicaragua, supra note 18, at ¶ 115. 
81 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 108, ¶¶ 403–
05 (Feb. 26). 
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Tadić.82 Tadić involved the issue of classification of conflict, not the jus ad 
bellum. The ICJ confirmed in the Genocide case that this latter level of 
control was insufficient for state responsibility purposes. Instead, the state 
concerned must exercise control over specific operations before the conduct 
of an insurgent group is attributable to it. For instance, merely providing 
financial or other support would not suffice, although it might qualify as 
intervention. 
V. Unconventional Statecraft and Armed Conflict 
Whenever an armed conflict is initiated as a matter of law, the lex 
specialis of international humanitarian law governs the activities of the 
parties thereto. The existence of an armed conflict is highly significant 
because international humanitarian law imposes restrictions and 
prohibitions on how hostilities may be conducted and affords certain groups 
and objects special protection from their effects. Armed conflict exists in 
two guises: (1) an international armed conflict between states and (2) a non-
international armed conflict between a state and a non-state organized 
armed group (or between two such groups). The law governing them differs 
to an extent, with that applying to international armed conflict being far 
more robust. 
If unconventional statecraft involves “hostilities” between the forces 
of the two states involved, it is incontrovertible that an international armed 
conflict is underway. A minor controversy exists over the level of hostilities 
needed to trigger an international armed conflict, but it is clear that anything 
beyond a de minimus exchange suffices.83 It makes no difference whether 
the state forces engaging in the unconventional statecraft are operating on 
their own or jointly with insurgents. In the latter case, the degree of control 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment ¶¶ 117, 131–40, 
145 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić].  
83 The authors agree with the position set forth in the ICRC Commentaries to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions that “[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict.” COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN 
THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952); COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION II FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK, AND 
SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA 28 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960); 
COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 
OF WAR 23 (Jean de Preux ed., 1960); COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 20 (Oscar M. Uhler 
& Henri Coursier eds., 1958).  
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that the forces exercise over the insurgents, if any, is irrelevant to the 
existence of an international armed conflict. 
A situation in which unconventional statecraft involves no combat 
action by the state’s forces is somewhat more complex. In a widely 
accepted finding in the Tadić case, the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber held that 
non-international armed conflicts are internationalized when an external 
state exercises “overall control” of a rebel group. Although the control need 
not reach the effective control level cited supra in the context of state 
responsibility, it “must comprise more than the mere provision of financial 
assistance or military equipment or training.”84 An international armed 
conflict between the respective states is initiated only when the state 
engaged in unconventional statecraft exercises sufficient control over the 
insurgents to generally direct their activities.  
Conclusion 
Unconventional statecraft will continue to be ubiquitous in the 
decades ahead, just as it was in the days immediately following the signing 
of the U.N. Charter. The progress of humankind towards achieving greater 
freedom and self-determination, fed by the global connectivity of our 
information age, guarantees that subjugated people everywhere will 
continue to rise up against oppressive governments—and the enemies of 
those repressive governments will continue to aid the insurgents, 
irrespective of international law concerns. In light of current events, it may 
be an opportune moment for the United States, with unconventional 
statecraft indelibly etched in its DNA,85 to reassess its long-standing legal 
analysis of unconventional statecraft. 
The United States has consistently interpreted the U.N. Charter to 
ban nearly all foreign support to insurgencies, believing that any assistance 
beyond non-discriminate humanitarian aid would constitute a use of force in 
violation of Article 2(4). Yet, this fundamentalist approach, while 
understandable in the context of the Cold War and the spread of 
communism, arguably lacks salience in the twenty-first century and runs 
counter to much state practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Tadić, supra note 82, at ¶ 137. 
85 The American victory in its War of Independence “would not have been possible” 
without French assistance, which included 90% of all gunpowder used by the American 
forces. BOOT, supra note 4, at 77–79. 
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U.S. President Harry Truman signed the United Nations Charter on 
August 8, 1945. Less than two years later, he delivered his celebrated 
speech to a joint session of Congress outlining the Truman Doctrine, which 
is generally considered the start of the Cold War.86 What is often forgotten 
with the passage of nearly seventy years is that Truman’s speech promised 
support to the governments of Greece and Turkey, which were battling 
insurgent flames fanned by the Soviet Union. Truman noted that the “very 
existence” of Greece was “threatened by the terrorist activities of several 
thousand armed men, led by Communists” in defiance of a democratic 
government that garnered 85% of the vote in the previous election. In the 
face of this threat, Truman declared: 
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must 
choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often 
not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the 
majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative 
government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, 
freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political 
oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a 
minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror 
and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and 
the suppression of personal freedoms . . . . 
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. 
They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They 
reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life 
has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the 
world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.87 
The Truman Doctrine ushered in the Cold War and the U.S. strategy of 
containment of the Soviet Union. To U.S. policymakers, it was “quite clear” 
that the Soviet Union sought “to bring the free world under its dominion by 
the methods of the cold war” and their “preferred technique [was] to subvert 
by infiltration and intimidation.”88  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Harry S. Truman, Special Message to Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman 
Doctrine, Pub. Papers 176 (1963), 
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st&st1 [http://perma.cc/BPD6-
WS8N]. 
87 Id. 
88 THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY, NSC 68, A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 34 (Apr. 
14, 1950),  
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In this historical context, it becomes apparent why the United States 
interpreted Article 2(4) in a manner designed to preserve strictly the status 
quo. As the Soviet Union sought to expand its sphere of influence, its policy 
was to foment internal insurrection designed to lead to the establishment of 
communist governments aligned with the Soviet Union. By deeming any 
such Soviet assistance to foreign insurgencies to be a violation of Article 
2(4), the United States could justify its countering actions as acts of 
collective self-defense. On the other hand, any activities conducted by the 
United States in support of foreign insurgencies against communist 
governments would simply be conducted covertly such that the role of the 
U.S. government would never be publicly acknowledged and, therefore, no 
public legal justification would be necessary. In short, the U.S. legal 
position on foreign support to insurgencies was designed to enable public 
condemnations of Soviet meddling, knowing that any analogous U.S. 
activities would be conducted covertly—and covert action directed by the 
President under his U.S. constitutional authorities need not comply with the 
U.N. Charter.89 
Seeming hypocrisy aside, there is an inherent tension between the 
fundamentalist U.S. interpretation of Article 2(4) in the context of foreign 
support to insurgencies and its policy imperative of supporting democracy 
and self-determination. This was evidenced in 2012 during debates over the 
legality of providing assistance to anti-Assad rebels in Syria, where the 
moral and policy imperatives seemed to demand assisting the rebels while 
the lawyers cautioned that such actions could violate Article 2(4).90  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-
1.pdf [http://perma.cc/CRQ4-RBBU]. 
89 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding non-self-executing treaties, including 
the U.N. Charter, are not enforceable in U.S. courts unless implemented into law by 
Congress); Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override International Law 
in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities (June 21, 1989), 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 179 
(finding that Article 2(4) is non-self-executing and therefore under domestic law the 
President may authorize actions inconsistent therewith); see Robert J. Delahunty & John 
Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 76 (2007) 
(“the Constitution does not forbid Presidents from taking action under their constitutional 
powers that run counter to rules of international law”). 
90 See, e.g., debating blog posts between Jack Goldsmith on Lawfare and Marty Lederman 
on Opinio Juris. Jack Goldsmith, Marty Lederman on the President’s Syria Press 
Conference, and a Brief Response, LAWFARE (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/marty-lederman-on-the-presidents-syria-press-
conference-and-a-brief-response/ [http://perma.cc/WKC6-2T46]; Marty Lederman, Syria 
Insta-Symposium: Marty Lederman Part I–The Constitution, the Charter, and Their 
Intersection, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/01/syria-insta-
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But the law-and-policy tensions and apparent duplicity is not 
unprecedented. In 1961, the United States sought ways to support 
insurgents seeking to overthrow President Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the 
Dominican Republic. The insurgents requested sniper rifles and other 
military equipment, yet U.S. intelligence agents assessed that the insurgents 
lacked the capability for effective revolution and, presumably, the State 
Department determined that providing such weapons would constitute a 
violation of Article 2(4). Accordingly, the United States refused to supply 
military arms, such as explosives, machine guns, and sniper rifles; however, 
small arms such as pistols and carbines were apparently supplied to the 
insurgents, in the words of a State Department memo, as “personal defense 
weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo.”91 
Trujillo was a brutal dictator who reportedly plundered over $800 million 
from his country and killed thousands of political opponents, so in the end 
the lawyers apparently found a creative loophole and the assassination 
weapon may have been delivered by diplomatic pouch.92  
Our analysis of the international law of unconventional Statecraft 
seeks to provide normative clarity to the question of what foreign support to 
insurgents—from non-discriminatory humanitarian aid to jointly conducted 
operations—is permissible. Unfortunately, it is hampered by the inherently 
opaque nature of foreign support to insurgencies and the related paucity of 
opinio juris on this issue; it is impossible, after all, to assess the underlying 
legal justification for unacknowledged activities. Nevertheless, our analysis 
suggests the following categorization of support and concomitant legal 
status: 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
symposium-marty-lederman-part-constitution-charter-intersection/ [http://perma.cc/ET5-
R24H]. 
91 W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 58 (1992) 
(citations omitted). 
92 Id. at 57–59. 
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 Non-Discriminatory Humanitarian Aid 
(food, medical supplies, tents/temporary 
shelter, non-military vehicles & 
communications equipment) 
Not Intervention 
Category 1 Not Use of Force 
 Not Armed Attack 
 
 Targeted/Discriminate Humanitarian Aid, 
Funding, Intelligence, Non-Lethal 
Assistance (leadership/organizational 
training, political subversion, information 
operations, logistics, etc.) 
Intervention 
Category 2 Not Use of Force 
 
Not Armed Attack 
 
 Targeting Intelligence, Materiel (military 
arms, vehicles, and communications 
equipment), Lethal Training, Operational 
Logistics Support 
Intervention  
Category 3 Use of Force 
 Not Armed Attack 
 
 Joint Operations (including “effective 
control”) 
Intervention 
Category 4 Use of Force 
 Armed Attack 
 
Fig. 2 Legality of Rebel Support 
  
These categories clearly assume a gap between Article 2(4) and Article 51 
such that not every illegal use of force constitutes an armed attack justifying 
a response in self-defense—a gap that the ICJ and most states accept. If one 
rejects the view that there is a gap between 2(4) and 51, as do the United 
States and one of the present authors, then Categories 3 and 4 would simply 
be merged and any of the activities within both categories would constitute 
an armed attack. 
Understanding that assessments of the legality of foreign-insurgent 
support are inherently contextual and value-driven, we acknowledge that the 
framework suggested above may appear overly rigid. It is, however, not 
offered to constrain hard policy choice, but rather to inform it. 
Unconventional statecraft is most effective when the domestic and 
international communities perceive it as lawful. The risk of its not being 
seen as such is a crucial factor in any mature policy deliberation, not only 
because its characterization as unlawful may open the legal door to certain 
responses on the part of the target state and its allies, but also because 
broader support and respect for the state engaging in the unconventional 
statecraft may erode. In other words, perceptions of unlawfulness can 
spawn negative reverberating effects throughout the international and 
domestic security environment in which a state operates. Perhaps as 
 Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5  
	  
376 
importantly, commitment to the international rule of law is a fundamental 
hallmark of value-driven participation in the global political system, a point 
on which states considering unconventional statecraft beyond the margins 
of the law should carefully reflect. 
